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ABSTRACT
Mounting overaccumulation of capital and material has compelled 
the Chinese government to seek solutions overseas. The Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), with its transregional infrastructure projects 
connecting Eurasia and Africa, is the hallmark venture in this effort. 
Chinese road, railway, port and energy projects, implemented under 
the BRI banner, have become widespread in Africa. This article traces 
drivers of the BRI in the post-reform evolution of the Chinese econ-
omy and conceptualises the BRI as a multi-vector “spatial fix” aimed 
at addressing chronic overaccumulation. Focusing on Kenya, Djibouti 
and Ethiopia, the paper documents how loan financing related to BRI 
projects reveals contradictions that arise from China’s spatial fix in 
Africa. Concerns about a looming debt crisis on the continent and the 
questionable economic sustainability of some BRI projects have 
become more pressing amidst the COVID-19-induced economic con-
traction. Hopes for Africa’s economic transformation based on 
increasing connectivity under the BRI are unlikely to materialise.
RÉSUMÉ
La suraccumulation croissante de capitaux et de matérial a contraint 
le gouvernement chinois à chercher des solutions à l’étranger. 
L’initiative « la Ceinture et la Route » (BRI), avec ses projets d’infras-
tructures transrégionales connectant l’Eurasie et l’Afrique, est la mar-
que de fabrique de cette stratégie. Les projets routiers, ferroviaires, 
portuaires et énergétiques chinois, mis en œuvre dans le cadre de la 
BRI, se sont répandus en Afrique. Cet article retrace les moteurs de la 
BRI dans l’évolution post-réforme de l’économie chinoise et concep-
tualise la BRI comme un « correctif spatial » multi-vecteur visant à 
remédier à la suraccumulation chronique. En se concentrant sur le 
Kenya, Djibouti et l’Éthiopie, l’article documente comment le finan-
cement des prêts liés aux projets de la BRI révèle les contradictions 
qui émergent du « correctif spatial » de la Chine en Afrique. Les 
inquiétudes concernant une crise de la dette imminente sur le 
continent et la viabilité économique douteuse de certains projets 
de la BRI sont devenues plus pressantes dans le contexte de la 
contraction économique entraînée par la COVID-19. Il est peu proba-
ble que les espoirs de transformation économique de l’Afrique basés 
sur une connectivité accrue dans le cadre de la BRI se matérialisent.
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Introduction
Africa’s integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global programme of infra-
structure construction (amongst other elements), announced by China in 2013, has been 
framed by official discourses that promise “win–win” development results from closer 
cooperation and connectivity. The proceedings of the 2018 Forum for China–Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) summit are riddled with references to the BRI, speaking of Africa 
as “being part of the historical and natural extension of the Belt and Road” and an 
“important participant in the initiative” (FOCAC 2018, para. 4.2, emphasis added). 
According to the Chinese government, 37 African countries and the African Union 
committed to the initiative by April 2019 (Dollar 2019, 2). Central to the BRI in Africa 
remains the continent’s integration into trans-regional infrastructure networks and corri-
dors, as part of the new Maritime Silk Road (see Jian 2018; Mayer and Zhang 2020; Sum 
2019), which complements the land-based “Belt” through Eurasia. Large-scale projects, 
such as port developments in Djibouti and Lamu, Kenya, and railway lines in Ethiopia and 
Kenya, have become BRI “flagship” projects that are expected to boost economic growth 
and generate widespread prosperity.
Notwithstanding the official “win–win” narrative, the BRI has caused major controver-
sies in Africa. Van der Merwe argues that
[T]he infrastructure plans expose the initiative [BRI] as unashamedly colonial, as it reinforces 
the legacy of transporting resources towards ports – and not between neighbouring states. 
Even in the case where transport infrastructure is created between states, the assumption is 
still that this would facilitate the movement of Chinese remotely manufactured goods onto 
markets. (van de Merwe 2019, 210)
China’s supposed “debt trap diplomacy” (Chellaney 2017) has caused even more con-
sternation. All the way to the White House, it has been politically instrumentalised to 
discredit Chinese investments in African infrastructure (see Nyabiage 2019; Reuters 2018; 
The Economist 2019). A Chinese “debt trap” would imply an intentional attempt to 
ensnare the continent in debt and should be refuted (Carmody 2020). Nonetheless, the 
quantity and sustainability of debt contracted by some African states for Chinese-built 
infrastructure has become a valid concern, as have the economic feasibility and long-term 
benefits of some BRI projects. While Western corporates have generally welcomed the 
influx of Chinese loan finance into Africa (see Sun et al. 2017), a Moody’s executive 
cautioned: “Unless African investment financed by Chinese loans generates substantial 
economic gains that boost debt servicing capacity of Sub-Saharan African governments, 
the credit implications of such lending include higher debt burdens, weaker debt afford-
ability and weaker external positions” (Rogovic quoted in IOL Business Report 2018). The 
COVID-19-induced global economic contraction has added urgency to these matters.
We undertake a critical assessment of the drivers of the BRI and reveal contradictions 
that shed doubt on official narratives such as that “openness, transparency, and win–win 
results are advocated and practiced [. . .] with a view to promoting high-quality and 
sustainable development for all” (FOCAC 2018, para. 4.1). While the imperatives driving 
the BRI have their origins in the dynamics of, and interactions between, the global and 
Chinese economies, the materialisation of the BRI also depends on the political demand in 
receiving economies for infrastructure (see Nugent 2018). In fact, the BRI has become 
a welcome source of funding for African governments to implement infrastructure 
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projects that have long been planned (Anthony 2020). By implication, there is a need for 
a strategic-relational coupling between state elites in Africa and those in China (as well as 
an increasing number of other actors from both public and private sectors) to bring BRI 
projects into being (Han and Webber 2020). In this paper we conceptualise the BRI as 
a multi-vector and -sector spatial fix (Harvey 1982), reflective of both general and specific 
problems and contradictions of capital accumulation in China and more widely, while also 
being interwoven with geopolitical dimensions. We then explore the implications of this 
meta-project for Africa through three case studies of countries heavily involved in the 
initiative: Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
The post-reform evolution of China’s economy and the BRI imperative
Domestic dynamics within China now compel both policymakers in Beijing and market 
actors to seek opportunities overseas, as overcapacity and over-accumulation necessitate 
the export of these excess volumes. After economic reforms began in 1978, China moved 
rapidly towards the market becoming the dominant resource allocation mechanism in that 
society (Yao 2010). Through a “passive revolution,” where a ruling elite dramatically changes 
policy course to cement its rule (Gramsci 1971), an ever more hierarchical and ruthless form 
of capitalism emerged in China (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2004, 26). Beijing’s member-
ship in the World Trade Organization in 2001 and thus the strictures of global neoliberalism 
commenced a new chapter in China’s internationalisation of its economy, with additional 
tariff cuts and service and agricultural sectors being liberalised (Panitchpakdi and Clifford 
2002, 164).
Consequent to the reforms, the export-oriented sector rapidly became the engine of 
growth. In 1980, China exported US$11.3 billion globally, whereas by 2017 this had reached 
US$2.4 trillion – 212 times more (World Bank 2019a). China is now characterised by “a 
powerful urban–industrial capitalist class, especially in the southern coastal region, signifi-
cantly influencing government circles up to and including the Politburo, as well as having 
close ties with foreign investors and companies based in China for export purposes” (Vanaik 
2013, 199). Indeed there is substantial straddling between the public and private sectors, as 
hundreds of members of China’s parliament are billionaires (Wee 2018). Allied with the 
managerial elements located in the reduced state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, they 
demand huge expenditure on support for the export sector and on constructing infrastruc-
ture across the country to facilitate their business interests (Lui 2007, 90–95). In the 2000s this 
contributed substantially to global commodity price increases, creating a spike that spawned 
high growth rates across Africa (see Taylor 2014). Although this was celebrated by some as 
a period when the continent was “rising,” this narrative had little to do with socio-economic 
realities (Taylor 2016).
As a result of the dynamics described above, contradictions began to develop and 
mature in the Chinese economy. Chinese workers are no longer an inexpensive reserve 
pool of labour, since rapid economic growth drove wages substantially higher as 
shortages emerged in coastal cities where foreign direct investment (FDI) was initially 
concentrated. The median monthly wage in Shanghai is now US$1135, which is close to 
that of Poland ($1569) and virtually the same as that of Hungary ($1139) (Rapoza 2017). 
Fundamentally for China, since around 2010 wages have increased more quickly than 
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labour productivity, leading to a decline in both the profit share and the profit rate (see 
Gaulard 2015).
To retain export competitiveness and outcompete imports, what matters to an econ-
omy is not absolute wage rates but rather how high they are relative to labour produc-
tivity. In response to rising wages some major companies, such as the Taiwanese 
company Foxconn, which assembles many of Apple’s iPhones, relocated their assembly 
operations to inland China (Grimmel and Li 2018). Such relocations inland incentivised the 
government to improve transport links to the East through the BRI, particularly as getting 
high technology to market is time-sensitive, given rapid product turnover times, and land 
transportation is quicker than that by sea. The movement of assembly factories inland 
represents an initial aspect or element of the spatial fix to profit pressure, but the BRI 
represents its fullest expression.
From 1977 to 2007, China’s output-capital ratio generally tended to increase, rising to 0.69 by 
2007. Since then, China’s output-capital ratio has again trended downward, falling to 0.54 by 
2015. If China’s output-capital ratio continues to fall, it will approach the level that historically 
was associated with the American Great Depression. (Li 2017, 398)
This is also reflected in the declining profit rate. Between 1990 and 2010, China’s business 
sector profit rate was circa 25%, significantly higher than that in the United States at 
approximately 10% (Li 2016, 168). This profit rate accounted for China’s precipitous 
accumulation of capital. However, China’s profit rate peaked in 2011 and since then has 
fallen by 30%. The rate in 2019 was no higher than the annual rate for 2009, which marked 
the depth of the financial crisis (Green 2019, 2). Some estimates also suggest that total 
factor productivity in China fell at a rate of 2.3% per annum from 2008 to 2010 (Wu 2014 
cited in Huang 2016), as the country struggled with the middle income trap, where it is no 
longer a very low labour cost producer, with the majority of the world’s high-technology 
development remaining concentrated in core countries.
China’s profit growth rate has now been considerably lower than the rate of accumula-
tion for some time, thus decreasing the capital–output ratio. In 2017, China’s gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) was 41.89% (World 
Bank 2019b). The contrast between China’s accumulation or investment rate and its 
declining profit growth rate has been quite stark since 2011, as Table 1 shows.
Inter-capitalist competition within China means that profits are unevenly circulated. 
Thus, even if the economy-wide average rate of profit stays positive (even as low as 2.7%, 
for instance), substantial sections of the economy may experience negative returns if the 
average profit rate falls beneath an acceptable level (dependent on sector). With profits 
being squeezed in China, generating new avenues for profit abroad is a key motive for 
Chinese enterprises’ involvement in the BRI.
Table 1. China’s accumulation rate versus its profit growth rate.




Data source: Li (2016, 169).
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Profit-related problems were compounded by events following the North Atlantic 
Financial Crisis of 2008–2009. As many Western economies went into recession, the 
market for Chinese exports contracted. Confronting sluggishness in exports (the basis at 
the time for its growth model), Chinese policymakers initiated a massive stimulus pack-
age, much of it being spent on infrastructure (Yu Qin 2016). China used more cement from 
2011 to 2013 than the United States consumed in the entire twentieth century 
(Washington Post 2015). In addition, China’s steel industry produced 300–400 million 
tons of excess capacity (Huang 2016; Cai 2017). Largely deployed into construction, 
China’s gross fixed capital formation swelled from US$1.38 trillion in 2007 to US$5.12 
trillion in 2017 (CEIC 2019).
As a capitalist economy matures, industry tends to become more capital intensive; 
thus, investment in machinery rises relative to labour costs, depressing the rate of profit. 
This results in “the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall” (Marx, 1988 [1894], 
211–266) as the contradiction between the burgeoning technological forces of produc-
tion and the social relations of production develops, due to there being an inadequate 
market for industrial products domestically.
In China, the rapid growth of the economy has spurred wage growth, putting pressure 
on profit rates and encouraging growth in the organic composition of capital or the 
substitution of capital for labour, in addition to generating pressure for offshoring. Marx 
suggests that ways out from the falling rate of profit may be located in an escalating rate 
of exploitation of labour; depression of wages below the value of labour power; relative 
overpopulation so as to influence the depression of wages; and foreign expansion 
through trade (Marx 1988 [1894], 232–240). Other than foreign trade, none of these 
solutions may be initiated in China, which is in harmony with Marx’s view that crisis 
tendencies are domestically produced within the capitalist mode of production and thus 
a national resolution is not feasible. Thus, locating new markets abroad and exporting 
surplus material and capital are potential “spatial fixes” for China’s economic problems of 
over-accumulation and falling profits (Harvey 2016, 65).
The BRI as a multi-vector “spatial fix”
Capital’s expansive tendency has been at the heart of Marxist theories of imperialism. In 
Lenin’s 1948 [1917] thought, the over-production of capital necessitated new outlets for 
investment. Luxemburg (2004 [1913]) argued that capitalists strove for the continuation 
of profits through discharging surplus commodities abroad as well as accessing new 
supply sources and pools of labour. What David Harvey (1982) termed the “spatial fix,” 
then, is one possible reaction to over-accumulation and involves changing geographies of 
capital investment and sunk costs in long-gestation endeavours such as physical infra-
structure. Harvey’s “fix” suggests that capital is “fixed in and on the land for a relatively 
long period of time (depending on its economic and physical lifetime)” (Harvey 2003, 
115). In a metaphorical sense, this signifies a “particular solution to capitalist crises 
through temporal deferral and geographical expansion” (Harvey 2003, 115) in that surplus 
capital is deployed abroad in investments with long gestation times. Both of these are in 
evidence in Chinese engagements in Africa (see Zajontz 2020a, 2020b).
Whilst we acknowledge that Chinese capitalist engagement with the African continent 
is necessarily historically specific, the “moving out” of Chinese surplus capital, and “loan- 
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debt investment” (Sum 2019, 538) under the BRI in particular, manifests spatio-temporal 
tendencies inherent to capitalist accumulation more generally, as described by Harvey. 
This assessment should be enough to take away some of the rancorous moralising about 
whether Chinese capitalist engagement with the continent is superior or inferior to other 
capitalist ventures in Africa, even if state-owned capital has, to some extent, dissimilar 
time frames and constraints (Lee 2017). As Ayers argues, “‘[c]apitalism with Chinese 
characteristics’ does not cease to be capitalism; yet largely absent from the voluminous 
literature on the role of China (and other emerging states) is a consistent theory of 
capitalism” (Ayers 2013, 236). The fundamental logic and impetus of capitalism and 
capital is the amassing of profits: the “boundless drive for enrichment” and the “passio-
nate chase after value” (Marx 1976 [1867], 254).
Given its export-oriented growth model, Beijing’s currency reserves rocketed from US 
$200 billion in 2001 to nearly US$4 trillion in 2014. The necessity to reinvest these reserves 
was one of the factors that led Xi Jinping to instigate a major new plan, as the dynamics of 
over-accumulation combined with the specifics of China’s export-oriented economy. Xi 
initially announced the so-called New Silk Road as a programme of massive infrastructural 
construction across Eurasia to facilitate trade and investment. A Maritime Silk Road was 
presented later, linking China across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The project(s) seek to 
quicken the economic integration of large parts of the world under Chinese economic, 
and consequently, in time, political leadership (Maçães 2018).
Within a year of its launch, Beijing established the Asian Infrastructure and Investment 
Bank with US$100 billion in capital; 56 states swiftly signed up as members. China also 
inaugurated a US$40 billion Silk Road Fund, intended for private equity projects. In 
May 2017, China hosted the Belt and Road Summit, which national leaders from nearly 
thirty countries attended. Xi Jinping (2019) has closely aligned the BRI to his own 
character and rule. Reflecting its immensity, “the projected investment under BRI ranges 
from USD1.4 trillion to USD6 trillion” (Fan Zhai 2018, 85). That the BRI serves as an effective 
spatial fix for China was openly admitted by He Yafei, vice minister of the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, who stated that:
The excess capacity has been caused by China’s fundamental economic readjustments 
against the global economy. With the ensuing knock-on effects of the global financial crisis 
manifesting in the economic stagnation of advanced nations, coupled with the slowdown in 
China’s domestic demand, industrial overcapacity, accumulated over several decades, has 
been brought into sharp relief . . . [and] has resulted in a steep drop in profits [and] the 
accumulation of debt and near bankruptcy for many companies. If left unchecked, it could 
lead to bad loans piling up for banks, harming the ecosystem, and bankruptcy for whole 
sectors of industries that would, in turn, affect the transformation of the [Chinese] growth 
model and the improvement of people’s livelihoods. It could even destabilise society. The 
Chinese government, guided by the principles laid out at the third plenum, has put forward 
guidelines for its resolution. The most important thing is to turn the challenge into an 
opportunity by “moving out” this overcapacity on the basis of its development strategy 
abroad and foreign policy. (He Yafei 2014)
President Xi has also argued that China’s neighbours have “extremely significant strategic 
value” (quoted in Cai 2017). The BRI, then, and the associated Industrial Capacity Cooperation 
(ICC) project to export surplus industrial capacity overseas (Kenderline and Ling, 2018) cannot 
be separated from domestic considerations in China. Overcapacity and over-accumulation 
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are, as has been noted, the stimuli behind Beijing’s drive to export the products of excess 
capacity overseas and transfer surplus capital abroad (China became a net exporter of capital 
in 2014). This therefore represents a multi-vector spatial fix, as the BRI will achieve a variety of 
objectives simultaneously. Trade remains the primary vector of the spatial fix under the BRI. 
Already by 2014–2016, trade between the nations involved in the BRI and China had reached 
more than US$3 trillion (Ehizuelen and Abdi 2018), massively surpassing Chinese investments 
in the infrastructure and other sectors in those countries. “Expansive accumulation” in the 
context of the BRI relates to the entirety of the Chinese economy, including trade, and should 
not be reduced to outward FDI. BRI partner countries provide a spatial fix through the 
provision of market, investment and debt outlets.
In its concrete manifestation of the BRI, the Chinese spatial fix spans a multitude of 
locales, territories and scales, thereby firmly integrating Eurasia and Africa into a “China- 
oriented infrastructural mode of growth in production, finance and security” (Sum 2019, 
529; see also Mayer and Zhang 2020). The BRI is a way to open up markets for Chinese goods 
through infrastructural improvements and the spreading of Sino standards. It will also 
integrate other territories into China-centred global production networks to take advantage 
of factor inputs or endowments, such as low-cost labour or high-quality and/or low-cost raw 
materials. “Beijing is attempting to create a connected and cohesive Eurasian entity with 
China as [the] focal point of the underlying connectivity” (Wolf 2020, 1), with an increasing 
emphasis on advanced manufacturing and innovation domestically (Cai 2017).
These aspects are also securitised as the BRI serves as a geopolitical project to embed 
allies economically, where loans can be potentially securitised against existing assets. 
Although highly controversial, this hypothetically allows China to exercise substantial/ 
excessive influence over host governments’ policy regimes if there is debt distress or loans 
go into default. China prefers to give concessional loans rather than grants to recipient 
states in order to maintain political leverage (confidential personal communication, 2019). 
The diversion of China’s problems overseas via the BRI and associated ICC projects 
announced in 2014, however, holds within its dynamics challenges for Africa. In particular, 
so-called “debt diplomacy” has been identified as a major issue of concern.
The BRI in Africa: high costs, limited benefits?
If successfully implemented, the BRI will involve around seventy countries and have 
a declared total investment in the trillions of dollars (Balding 2017). Doubts about the 
availability of such colossal financing, concerns about the sustainability of the debt 
incurred by participating states and the question as to how Beijing will respond to such 
uncertainties are critical. Indeed, Ansar et al. (2016, cited in Plummer 2019) found that in 
most cases in China, infrastructural investment had a negative effect on the economy 
through the debt channel. The sustainability of BRI financing will no doubt depend in 
part on the productivity of BRI projects themselves, with a mixed record to date. Some, 
such as the Chinese purchase of the Greek port of Piraeus, have boomed (Maçães 2018), 
whereas others (some of which are described in more detail below) have experienced 
severe problems. In this instance, it is crucial to remember that at one point during 
China’s transition towards state-steered capitalism, up to 40% of China’s domestic 
policies were designated as experimental (UNDP 2014). The BRI can in this sense be 
conceptualised as an extension of an experimental sovereignty regime from China to 
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Eurasia and beyond (Carmody, Krageulund, and Reboredo 2020). Indeed, Narins and 
Agnew (2020, 6) see the BRI promoting “a new, aspirational globalist sovereignty regime 
identity” (original emphasis).
The opacity of Chinese policy on its loan disbursements is of concern (Dollar 2019; 
Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2019; Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019; Morris et al. 
2020). Official data on Chinese loans are not publicly available, and thus all circulated 
statistics are approximations. Beijing is not a member of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and it does not take part in that organisation’s 
Creditor Reporting System. Furthermore, Chinese state banks rarely publish information 
with regard to financing contracts, while recipients of such loans habitually do not make 
such information known. However, data show that from 2000 to 2017 the Chinese 
government, banks and contractors extended US$143 billion worth of loans to African 
governments and SOEs (Infomineo 2018), and estimates suggest that loans to Africa by 
the China Development Bank and the Export–Import Bank of China are approximately 
23% of China’s overseas total (Alden and Lu Jiang, 2019).
Debt sustainability concerns in Africa have also mounted in the light of the 
COVID-19-induced global economic contraction, which leaves several African states, 
such as Zambia, Kenya and Djibouti, on the brink of default. Two key issues on the 
financing of BRI projects in Africa have arisen. The first centres around the question 
of whether the capital lent will leave recipient countries with an amount of debt 
that may hinder other investment in sectors that need financing. The second is, will 
the large amounts going towards countries as part of the BRI spawn an unhealthy 
dependency on China?
Rana Mitter has noted that deliberately attempting to entrap countries in debt would 
run the risk of generating a backlash, amongst both populations in general and, over 
time, politicians (cited in Carmody 2020). Depending on the politico-institutional con-
text, the latter are to a greater or lesser degree accountable to the general public. 
However, the structural power and importance of China as a market may now insulate it 
from any backlash in particular cases. For example, Michael Sata, who ran an election 
campaign for the presidency of Zambia on an explicitly anti-Chinese platform, had the 
Chinese ambassador as his first official visitor to State House after his inauguration and 
quickly rowed back from any anti-Chinese sentiment (Carmody 2016). Debt entrapment 
would also discredit the policy of non-interference espoused in the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, although China has already conditioned loans, as in the case of 
Angola, on having an International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity programme in place 
(Lwanda 2019).
The narrative of China’s alleged “debt diplomacy” has partly sprung from the opacity 
of Chinese lending. Neither of the two main lenders, the China Development Bank and 
the China Exim Bank, disclose their lending terms, although it appears that this varies 
from interest-free loans to fully commercial rates. The African countries under scrutiny in 
this article, associated with the BRI, and the amount received in loans from China from 
2000 to 2018 are presented in Table 2 (note that the data indicate quantities borrowed 
after 2000; they do not specify current debt figures given repayments have been made 
on such loans).
It is important to emphasise that in discussions of the so-called “Chinese debt trap,” 
Beijing’s share of Africa’s debt is often exaggerated. A Jubilee Debt Campaign report in 
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2018 found that, on average, only 20% of African government external debt is owed to 
China, and around 17% of external interest payments by African governments were 
identified as being made to China. At the same time, 32% of African government external 
debt is owed to private lenders, and 35% to multilateral institutions such as the IMF 
(Jubilee Debt Campaign 2018). Reckless lending to the continent by the Western capitalist 
world, in particular the immense quantities that may be reasonably characterised as 
odious debt (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011), has been far more destructive to Africa. 
However, Chinese loans have recently increased substantially, and in the context of the 
BRI, there are signs that several African nations involved in the initiative are now in danger 
of debt distress, with financial arrangements for infrastructure projects being the main 
problem. Given its growing loan portfolio on the continent, China is also implicated in the 
looming debt crisis for the continent as a whole in the context of COVID. We now turn to 
the specifics of flagship BRI projects in our case study countries.
Kenya: piles of debt and a new “Lunatic Line”
In Kenya,1 the government has commissioned both semi-concessional and commercial 
loans from China (as well as from global markets) since 2014 in an attempt to kick-start 
infrastructure development. This came after Kenya’s ascent into the “lower middle- 
income economy” category in 2014, which ended the country’s access to concessional 
loans from the international financial institutions. Beijing’s prominent role started with the 
China Exim Bank funding 90% of the US$3.6 billion for the 485-kilometre Mombasa– 
Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) line (Munda 2019), which has been cast as 
a flagship project of both the BRI and Kenya’s own “Vision 2030” development framework 
(Wissenbach 2020). The SGR construction was largely responsible for driving up Kenyan 
debt to China from US$756 million in 2014 to US$6.47 billion by 2019 (Olander 2020). 
Kenya has also issued Eurobonds to international markets to the tune of US$6.1 billion 
Table 2. Chinese loans to selected Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
countries, 2000–2018 ($ millions).
Year Djibouti Ethiopia Kenya
2000 0 0 0
2001 0 1 6
2002 0 0 6
2003 12 0 0
2004 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0
2006 0 1,900 46
2007 0 207 65
2008 0 0 57
2009 0 619 365
2010 36 555 263
2011 8 1,158 225
2012 64 177 1,191
2013 814 5,933 32
2014 0 773 3,730
2015 0 613 1,670
2016 365 824 1,095
2017 115 735 296
2018 0 234 0
TOTAL 1,414 13,729 9,047
Data source: Bräutigam et al. (2019).
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(Olander 2020). China accounted for 22% of Kenya’s external debt portfolio by the end of 
2018 (Munda 2019).
The end of the five-year grace periods for SGR loans drove up debt service payments 
to Chinese lenders, which reportedly add up to about US$888 million in 2020 (Olander 
2020), although Chinese lenders have agreed to pause debt repayments until the end 
of 2020 as part G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (Bilal and Tadesse 2020). In 
2017, transport minister James Macharia still expected that the SGR would boost 
Kenya’s GDP by 1.5%, enabling the government to pay back the loans “in about four 
years” (quoted in Kacungira 2017). Currently, it seems unlikely that Kenya will be able to 
repay the loans within the agreed 15-year period, unless the country gets significant 
debt relief from other creditors. Since the railway’s inauguration in May 2017, the SGR 
has failed to yield profits. By May 2020, the SGR had incurred a combined operating loss 
of about US$200 million. At the same time, the Kenyan government is contractually 
obliged to pay a fixed quarterly operation fee of about US$28.8 million to the operator 
Afristar, which is owned by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) 
(Mutai 2020). In June 2020, the Budget and Appropriations Committee of the National 
Assembly ascertained that Kenya Railways was unable to pay outstanding dues of 
about US$350 million to the operator, causing fears of operations coming to a halt 
(Mutua 2020). A committee report stated that “[t]he committee recommends that 
renegotiation on the current Operating Agreement by planning to reduce the opera-
tion costs by at least 50% be initiated by the government” (quoted in Mutai 2020). Yet it 
seems unlikely that the set operation fees will be slashed by half, considering that such 
compensation for Chinese firms provides for another means of capital repatriation 
which is essential to China’s spatial fix. The losses incurred fortify long-standing doubts 
about the economic feasibility of the project.
A 2013 report by the World Bank Africa Transport Unit stated that freight traffic within 
the entire East African Community (EAC) rail network could, by 2030, reach 14.4 million 
tons annually. The same report concluded that “the construction of a new standard gauge 
line in a new right-of-way is only justified if additional traffic attracted to the line 
amounted to 55.2 million tons per year” (World Bank 2013, 4; see also Taylor 2020). In 
other words, there were clear indications that projected demand would not suffice to 
redeem the immense costs related to the construction of a new SGR and that 
a refurbished metre-gauge network would have been a sufficient and more economical 
alternative. The fact that Kenyan decision makers opted for the SGR suggests that the 
demand for a BRI “flagship” was first and foremost political.
Thus far, the SGR has remained uncompetitive compared to road hauliers. Reuters 
reported a container travelling from Mombasa to Nairobi to cost US$800 on the road but 
$1100 on the SGR (Mirire 2019). Road hauliers usually charge $1900 for transporting a 40- 
foot container from Mombasa to Kampala, whilst the same container, if it travels on the 
SGR to Naivasha and from there on the road to Kampala, cost US$2180 in mid-2020 
(Andae 2020). A Railway Development Levy, consisting of a 1.5% tax on any goods 
imported into Kenya, that has been introduced to help repay the SGR loans has 
a deadweight effect. In other words, Kenya has had to increase the cost of doing business 
in the country, making the country less attractive to investors, in order to create revenues 
for debt service (Taylor 2020). Furthermore, realisation of the plan for a regional SGR 
network that serves the entire Northern Corridor is becoming increasingly unlikely. For 
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one, in the light of Kenya’s waning debt sustainability, China has decided not to extend 
another loan for the remaining stretch between Naivasha and the Ugandan border, 
causing a situation in which the railway currently terminates in the middle of “nowhere” 
(see Mirire 2019), from where cargo must be transhipped, at additional cost and time.
Initially, an SGR was planned to stretch along the entire Northern Corridor serving the 
entire East African region, with connecting lines planned to extend to Kampala, Juba, 
Kigali and the Kivus, which would have created revenues for Kenya Railways for transit 
traffic destined for the country’s landlocked neighbours (Kacungira 2017). As the 
Chairperson of Kenya’s parliamentary Budget and Appropriations Committee, Kimani 
Ichung’wa, put it:
It[’s] time we ask ourselves what we are getting from the SGR and take a walk down to 
Naivasha. How many trains utilise this railway? [. . .]. If you read our Public Investments 
Committee report in the past parliament, you know that the viability of the line ends here 
(Nairobi), unless if you interconnected the port of Mombasa with landlocked countries, but 
without that interconnection, it is not possible. (quoted in Anyanzwa 2020)
What is more, competing rail infrastructure in the form of Tanzania’s SGR, which competes 
for Rwandan, Ugandan and Eastern Congolese cargo and whose construction is steadily 
approaching Lake Victoria under the rigid “supervision” of President Magufuli, further 
compromises the economic viability of Kenya’s SGR “flagship” (Zajontz 2020a, 177–179). 
BRI projects have also been highly problematic in other countries in the region.
Djibouti: China’s now highly indebted geo-strategic hub
Djibouti has received US$1.4 billion in loans from the Chinese to expand the Ghoubet salt 
port; the Damerjog livestock export port; the Addis–Djibouti Railway (Djibouti’s share 
being US$492 million); the Djibouti–Ethiopia Water Pipeline; and the Doraleh Container 
Terminal/Multipurpose and Djibouti Port as the terminal of the Ethiopia–Djibouti Railway, 
which cost US$590 million (Zhou 2017). Chinese companies are also building Africa’s 
largest free trade zone there, with the first phase having opened in 2018 (Maritime 
Executive 2018).
It is reported that Chinese finance now accounts for 77% of the country’s debt (Dahir 
2019) and that it was under pressure from China that the country evicted Dubai Ports (DP) 
World from the operation of the port next door to its first ever overseas military base in 
2018 (see Bräutigam 2020 for more details). DP World is suing the state-owned China 
Merchants Company for “bypassing its concession agreement with Djibouti and acquiring 
an indirect shareholding in the Doraleh terminal” (Dahir 2019, 3). Some have suggested 
this is part of a geopolitical and economic competition to dominate the trade through the 
Red Sea.
There is some evidence that Chinese aid and investment are deployed geo-strategically. 
For example, Dreher et al. (20182019) find that African leaders’ birth regions receive substan-
tially more Chinese aid than others in their countries. Moreover, Djibouti sits astride one of the 
world’s most important shipping lanes. In 2016 China passed a law that forces all Chinese 
industries involved in international transportation to provide aid and supplies to its navy if 
needed (Maçães 2018). Djibouti is the site of China’s first ever overseas military base, which it 
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had said previously it would never have any of. Djibouti also provides a “natural port and 
railhead for its giant neighbour Ethiopia” (Styan 2019, 192).
While some argue that Djibouti has been able to skilfully negotiate its strategic geogra-
phy to achieve greater policy autonomy (e.g. Styan 2016; Le Gouriellec 2018), there is 
a moral hazard attached to loans under the BRI umbrella as politicians in recipient countries 
are attracted by the quick economic growth and employment creation such projects offer, 
even as debt has to be repaid over the long term. For example, according to the IMF (2019), 
real GDP growth in Djibouti averaged close to 7% during 2014–2017, with new infrastruc-
ture projects being a major driver (IMF 2017, cited in Zhou 2017). However, as noted above, 
its debt profile deteriorated dramatically during that time. A substantial debt overhang will 
reduce future economic growth as payments go to debt service rather than social spending, 
infrastructure development or other sectors, thereby depressing domestic demand and 
undermining the economy’s longer term growth potential. Djibouti’s debt service ratio, i.e. 
debt service as percentage of exports of goods and services, averaged 15.6% between 2000 
and 2015 but reached a shocking 57.8% in 2017 (World Bank n.d.a).
An IMF report (IMF 2017, 7) noted that
Djibouti remains at a high risk of debt distress . . . solvency and liquidity risks are significant 
over the projection horizon, and all the debt burden indicators breach their respective policy 
dependent thresholds by sizeable margins . . . All the solvency debt burden indicators exhibit 
protracted breaches of their respective thresholds. In addition, liquidity risks have increased 
significantly compared with . . . 2015.
Indeed, Chinese loans to Djibouti are rather inconsequential in the wider global picture. 
Yet Djibouti’s annual GDP is only circa US$1.8 billion. While there have been overblown 
accusations about the “billions” in Chinese loans, the fact is that for a country with such 
a small economy, like Djibouti, assuming such levels of debt is problematic in general and 
particularly serious if that debt is owed to a single source.
Ethiopia: costs and benefits of the “TAZARA of the new era”2
Ethiopia is home to another BRI “flagship project,” the country’s new, partly electrified SGR 
linking Addis Ababa with the port of Djibouti. At first sight, the project looked promising in 
terms of “win–win cooperation.” Landlocked Ethiopia received a “lifeline” on rails to the Gulf of 
Aden, financed through a US$4.2 billion loan from China Exim Bank. In return, Africa’s second 
most populous country was firmly integrated into the BRI and its underlying Chinese-oriented 
mode of accumulation (see Sum 2019). However, the railway has contributed to the country’s 
growing external debt levels. As Table 2 shows, by the end of 2018 Ethiopia had contracted US 
$14 billion in Chinese loans. Ethiopia’s debt-to-GDP ratio, which, following major multilateral 
debt relief initiatives, stood at 35.1% in 2009, rose to 59.2% in 2018 (World Bank n.d.b). 
Ethiopia has faced similar problems to Kenya and fell behind in scheduled repayments for the 
SGR loans as well as management fees to the operator. As a result, the Ethiopian government 
engaged China in negotiations about extending the repayment period from 15 to 30 years – 
with success (Chen 2019). Equally, the operations of the Addis–Djibouti railway have yet to 
reach profitability. In 2019, the railway reportedly created US$40 million in revenues; its 
operating costs, however, were US$70 million, a situation the operators have tried to amelio-
rate by doubling the number of freight trains that run between the two termini from two to 
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four per week (Wondewossen 2020). Whether there is sufficient demand for this measure 
remains to be seen.
The relatively successful developmental state in Ethiopia is now unravelling, largely due to 
external debt pressures, in which China plays an important part (see Carmody, Krageulund, 
and Reboredo 2020). Debt is both a vector and an outcome of dependence, and despite 
substantial Chinese manufacturing investment in Ethiopia its main export to China is still 
sesame seeds. Irrespective of the developmental constraints that have arisen from Ethiopia’s 
indebtedness, the BRI infrastructure projects, especially the new SGR, at least principally bear 
developmental spillovers by linking the country’s (Chinese-run) special economic zones (SEZs) 
with export markets. However, as we have argued elsewhere, the Ethiopian experience of the 
Chinese-inspired SEZ model has itself been problematic, with employment created being 
largely low skilled and low paid (and feminised) and linkages to the local economy remaining 
minimal (Giannecchini and Taylor 2018).
Conclusion
The BRI is a peculiar medium upon which to pin African development hopes, unless there 
are serious and qualitative adjustments towards the goal of Africa’s structural transforma-
tion (Carmody 2017). This transformation’s ultimate goal must be “to break with produc-
tion for production’s sake (or surplus for surplus’s sake) and to organize a society geared 
to optimum consumption and optimum output in accordance with genuine human 
needs: a society in which the surplus and its utilization were democratically planned” 
(Foster 2007, 14). Africa’s resources must be taken control of by Africans and used to 
lessen inequality and promote sustainable development:
autonomous and hence continuous development will only occur when the periphery can 
establish exchange relations . . . which do not tie it into a system of dependency likely to 
perpetuate the underdevelopment created by . . . subordination to the dominant institutions 
of international capitalism. (Brett 1992, 13)
With its rise and incorporation into the global structures of power and governance in 
accordance with the normative principles of capitalism, China has joined these “dominant 
institutions”; consequently, South–South solidarity coming from this direction is likely to 
be largely voided of content, despite the progressive rhetoric that envelops the BRI (see 
Taylor 2017). As Ehizuelen and Abdi (2018, 290) note, participation in the BRI
is conditional on the involvement of Chinese firms overseas, whether in construction, the 
operation of projects, or the supply of materials. As a result, the initiative acts as an indirect 
subsidy for firms, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs), suffering financially from indus-
trial oversupply.
Furthermore, regarding the spatial-fix foundations of the BRI, infrastructural spatial fixes do 
not take place in smooth social spaces. Rather, they must deal with the actuality of contra-
dictory and multifaceted social dynamics (van der Merwe, Bond, and Dodd 2019). Violence 
against Chinese workers and managers in Africa has already occurred and if the dynamics 
identified above and associated with the BRI intensify, an unfortunate situation – not least for 
China – may develop. This is not new, of course: Lenin (1948 [1917]) noted that the drive to 
export capital overseas, and the subsequent need to defend that capital, propels states to 
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project their political, and sometimes military, power abroad, motivating expansion and 
simultaneous competition with other capital-exporting countries, although the dynamics of 
globalisation and interdependence may have altered this. Nonetheless, China has become 
much more involved in African security in recent years (Alden and Yixiao 2018).
The BRI is designed to serve China and the needs of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). However, according to Jones and Jinghan (2019, 1416),
projects like BRI are not meticulously planned by top leaders; rather they are loose “policy 
envelopes,” whose parameters and implementation are shaped by internal struggles for power 
and resources . . .. Accordingly, BRI is already unfolding in a fragmented, incoherent fashion, 
departing significantly from both its original design, in 2013, as part of “periphery diplomacy,” 
and from formal, top-level plans issued in 2015. This may generate outcomes that, far from 
reshaping the world in China’s image, could undermine Chinese foreign policy objectives.
They argue that the Chinese state is increasingly characterised by fragmentation, decen-
tralisation and internationalisation, where regional states and SOEs, for example, may 
ignore central guidance, even if President Xi has increased “cadre discipline and ideolo-
gical control.” The BRI and increased authoritarianism in China are related. As Kenderdine 
and Ling (2018, 41) argue, “through exporting the capital-works project model under the 
‘Belt and Road’ brand, ICC is effectively an acceptance of the reversal of the 3rd Plenum 
market reforms, avoiding the hard transition to a consumption-driven economy.”
Some econometric and modelling studies find that “Chinese-financed infrastructure 
reduces spatial inequalities and accelerates the diffusion of economic activity across 
geographic space” (Bluhm et al. 2018, 7) or that “with moderate assumptions on BRI 
investment, the simulation results indicated a global welfare gain of 1.3% of global GDP 
by 2030” (Maliszewska and van der Mensbrugghe 2019, 3). However, such projections are 
notoriously unreliable and neglect the temporal dimension of debt overhang. And, as 
a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic impact, African governments 
are now seeking to renegotiate the terms of loans provided by Chinese lenders and 
increasingly calling on Beijing to provide debt relief measures. The IMF estimates that sub- 
Saharan Africa’s GDP will shrink by 1.6% in 2020 due to the effects of the virus, depressed 
oil prices and reduced commodity prices (see UNCTAD 2020). This has come together with 
the decline in demand by China for African imports (due to the virus) to produce a perfect 
storm that has highlighted the problems associated with taking on excessive external 
debt: “The coronavirus outbreak has revealed cracks in the China–Africa dynamic. Gone 
are the days of Chinese big loans and major borrowing” (Deutsche Welle 2020). 
Interestingly, even before COVID-19, studies found that most of Africa would see little 
growth from the project: “[T]he non-BRI area sees some gains with an increase of 0.3%, 
most of which is captured by Ethiopia, Europe and the Rest of High-Income countries” 
(Maliszewska and van der Mensbrugghe 2019, 7), with some countries suffering as a result 
of trade diversion.
Whilst the spatial fix may see a reorganisation of fixed capital to serve as a safety valve 
for China’s crisis tendencies, the temporal nature is critical. The BRI fix may buy time for 
Beijing, but the contradictions of China’s development model may become obvious (see 
Bello 2019). China’s current economic problems make apparent the fact that it is very 
much integrated into the global capitalist system and that capital accumulation in China 
follows the same logic and experiences similar flaws as capitalist development does 
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elsewhere. Spatio-temporal fixes are in the long run unsustainable (Harvey 1982), partly 
now because of global ecological constraints (Moore 2015), but also because they depend 
on fragile social, political and institutional fixes (see Jessop 2013). While deferring the 
moment of reckoning, they do not address long-term problems.
Indeed, Kenderdine and Ling (2018, 42) argue that the capital being exported under 
the ICC “is essentially local government debt with unpriced risk, [and] that a debt- 
deflation scenario is being exported to China’s trading partners . . . which is introducing 
unaudited risk to the global capital pool.” The BRI is part of the global system of 
accumulation and its dynamics (van de Merwe 2019). This interacts with the priorities of 
the CCP, which as Lake (2017, 379) notes is Leninist in orientation, thereby empowering it 
“or China as a whole to act on behalf of subordinate peoples without their consent or 
even acquiescence.” The spatial fix of the BRI helps alleviate the crisis of overaccumulation 
in China by transferring capital to new spaces, with the prevailing regime of capital 
accumulation being thus expanded as new spatial systems are produced, and capital is 
redirected to zones where more profitable returns can be generated. These new spaces, as 
seen in Africa, are then bequeathed new infrastructures to construct diverse and swifter 
circuits of production, dissemination and utilisation – but with Chinese interests at heart. 
For Africa to intensify its own vulnerabilities as some sort of footnote to China’s own 
contradictions and CCP priorities will yet again highlight the continent’s desperate need 
for structural transformation and autocentric developmental visions.
Notes
1. “Lunatic Line” is the name given by some media to the British railway constructed in colonial 
times in Kenya (see Hyam 2006, 134).
2. Harking back to the glory days of Chinese solidarity with Africa, in China, the Chinese-built 
and -operated Addis Ababa–Djibouti line is commonly called the “Tanzania Zambia Railway 
of the New Era” (新时代的“新坦赞铁路”; xin shidai de“xin tan zan tielu”).
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